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Abstract In presence of time-variable energy tariffs,
users will try to schedule the usage of their electrical
appliances with the goal of minimising their bill. If the
variable price component depends on the peak aggre-
gate demand during each given hour, users will be in-
centivised to redistribute their consumption during the
day, thus lowering the overall peak consumption. The
process can be automated by means of an Energy Man-
agement System that chooses the best schedule while
satisfying the user’s constraints on the maximum toler-
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in: A. Facchini,
C. Rottondi and G. Verticale, “Emergence of Shared Be-
haviour in Distributed Scheduling Systems for Domestic Ap-
pliances”, Greenmetrics 2016 Workshop, in conjunction with
ACM Sigmetrics, Antibes, France, July 14th 2016
Authors are listed in alphabetical order
A. Facchini
Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA)
Univ. of Lugano (USI) - Univ. of Applied Science and Arts
of Southern Switzerland (SUPSI)
Tel.: +41 (0)58 666 66 68
Fax: +41 (0)58 666 66 61
E-mail: alessandro.facchini@supsi.ch
C. Rottondi
Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA)
Univ. of Lugano (USI) - Univ. of Applied Science and Arts
of Southern Switzerland (SUPSI)
Tel.: +41 (0)58 666 66 72
Fax: +41 (0)58 666 66 61
E-mail: cristina.rottondi@supsi.ch
G. Verticale
Dept. of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering (DEIB),
Politecnico di Milano (Italy)
Tel.: + 39 02 2399 3569
Fax: +39 02 2399 3413
E-mail: giacomo.verticale@polimi.it
able delays. In turn, users’ thresholds on delay tolerance
may slowly change over time. In fact, users may be will-
ing to modify their threshold to match the threshold of
their social group, especially if there is evidence that
friends with a more flexible approach have paid a lower
bill. We provide an algorithmic framework that models
the effect of social interactions in a distributed Demand
Side Management System and show that such interac-
tions can increase the flexibility of users’ schedules and
lower the peak power, resulting in a smoother usage
of energy throughout the day. Additionally, we provide
an alternative description of the model by using Markov
Chains and study the corresponding convergence times.
We conclude that the users reach a steady state after a
limited number of interactions.
Keywords Smart Grid · Demand Side Management ·
Agent-Based Modelling · Social Norm
1 Introduction
The application of Demand Side Management (DSM)
approaches to the smart grid ecosystem has recently
gained popularity and several frameworks aimed at shap-
ing the aggregated power load curve of groups of cus-
tomers [24] (e.g. to reduce/shift consumption peaks [30]),
avoiding outages and improving power quality [12], or
maximising the usage of Renewable Energy Sources (RE-
Ses) [14] have been proposed.
In DSM, different strategies may be adopted to mo-
tivate users to alter their energy usage patterns. Histori-
cally, stakeholders have focused on price-based policies:
dynamic pricing schemes exhibiting hourly variations
and reflecting the costs incurred by the smart grid sys-
tem to satisfy the customers’ demand have proven to be
effective when the objective is the minimisation of the
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users’ bill [8,13]. To this aim, customers may opt for co-
ordinated optimization schemes to avoid the drawbacks
of uncoordinated shifts in their energy usage schedules
(e.g. excessive consumption peaks during low-price pe-
riods). Coordinated solutions include centralized and
distributed DSM frameworks: the former typically max-
imize a shared utility function [6], whereas in the latter
each consumer locally defines her energy plan accord-
ing to her personal preferences (e.g. bill minimisation
or comfort maximization).
However, several recent studies investigated the ef-
fectiveness of non-monetary strategies in shaping and
reducing consumption by stimulating long-term changes
in beliefs and norms [11,4,23]. Indeed, consumers do
not live in isolation: they can interact with each oth-
ers and with public institutions, and therefore being
influenced in their own attitudes, preferences and pos-
sible actions. This approach is consistent with the so-
ciological paradigm of “Homo Socialis” [16], according
to which agents’ actions are not only determined by
the desire to maximize their utility but also driven by
shared norms, roles, and relationships. Therefore, so-
cial norms are nowadays an important topic of research
not only in contemporary sociology, economics or game
theory, but also in environmental sciences [1,19].
The main objective of our work is to take into ac-
count both the role of price policies and the influence
mechanisms of norms on energy consumption behaviours.
To this aim, we propose a distributed game-theoretic
DSM framework which relies on an agent-based model-
ing approach. The framework includes a model of the
social structures and interactions which define the re-
ciprocal influences of socially-connected agents. These
models make it possible to study the impact of social
interactions on the user tolerance to delaying the start-
ing time of their appliances, with or without knowledge
of the electricity bill and delay tolerance levels of other
users. In turn, the impact of delay tolerance on the elec-
tricity bill is modeled by using a load scheduling game
for distributed demand side management, where ratio-
nal agents run a distributed protocol to minimise the
users’ bills. The main contributions of this paper are:
– a description of the interaction mechanisms aimed
at modeling the influence of the society on individ-
ual delay tolerance preferences;
– an evaluation of how social interactions modify in-
dividual delay tolerance preferences, which, in turn,
affects the aggregated energy consumption curve ob-
tained at the end of the execution of the load schedul-
ing game;
– a Markov-chain model of the interaction mechanisms
and the evaluation of the time necessary to converge
to the steady state.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: Section 2 provides a short overview of the related
literature, whereas Section 3 describes the structure
of the agent-based model. An analytical model based
on Markov chains which captures the evolution of the
agent-based model is proposed in Section 4. The per-
formance assessment of our proposed model and the
discussion of the experimental results are provided in
Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in the final Section.
2 Related Work
A substantial body of literature addresses the prob-
lem of Demand Response (DR) in smart grids (see [29]
for a complete overview). Most of the proposed frame-
works assume fully automated DR mechanisms which
directly control the user’s electrical loads and operate
independently, without need of a direct involvement of
the user. Alternatively, Agent-Based Models (ABMs)
have raised interest in the smart grid research commu-
nity as a promising approach to capture the complex
interdependencies in the behaviour of electricity users
who take direct actions on their (controllable) electri-
cal appliances. Several recent studies propose frame-
works incorporating multi-agent systems to collabora-
tively detect and react to grid outages [26], to improve
the voltage profile by means of active/reactive power
load control [2], or to develop energy market control
strategies [9].
Some ABMs tackle socio-behavioural aspects of the
interactions among users and between users and utili-
ties: Worm et al. [31] propose a two-layered framework
including a short-term choice model which captures the
effects of energy price variations on the users’ consump-
tion patterns, depending on their comfort needs and on
the presence of local RESes (e.g. solar panels), and a
long-term behavioural model which defines how inter-
actions within the social network may alter users’ atti-
tudes towards comfort requirements, energy efficiency,
usage of RESes, and price policies. In this work we also
study the effects of social interactions on a user-defined
delay tolerance threshold, considering users’ personal
price-delay tolerance trade-off, but we depart from the
aforementioned work by explicitly taking into account
influence and imitation mechanisms within the proposed
ABM, analogously to what has been done e.g. in [3,28]
for residential water consumption.
Ramchurn et al. [27] describe a decentralised DSM
framework which allows autonomous software agents
installed at the customers’ premises to collaboratively
schedule the usage of domestic controllable appliances
with the aim of minimising peaks in the aggregated
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consumption within a neighbourhood, assuming the us-
age of dynamic pricing. The framework includes an
adaptive mechanism which models the learning process
adopted by the users to modify the deferral time of their
controllable loads based on predicted market prices for
the next day. Our proposed solution is also aimed at
peak shaving and adopts a similar learning approach to
update the users’ delay tolerance threshold.
In the distributed DSM systems proposed by Bar-
bato et al. [7] and Chavali et al. [10], residential user
agents are modelled as rational entities who solve a
Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) to minimise their
energy bill. Under this assumption (i.e., each user ap-
plies a best response strategy), the users can be consid-
ered as players in a non-cooperative game theoretical
framework: it has been proved in [removed citation]that
such game is a generalised ordinal potential game which
converge in a few steps to a pure Nash Equilibrium. In
this paper we adopt the same assumptions and build
upon the theoretical results therein discussed. However,
in this paper the MILP formulation therein provided
has been modified to take into account delay tolerance
thresholds based on the users’ attitudes.
Among the ABMs investigating influence and imi-
tation mechanisms between agents, Helbing et al. [18]
propose a model of norm formation in scenarios where
agents exhibit incompatible preferences, and where re-
wards or punishment mechanisms are adopted to en-
courage conformity to the behaviour of others. In [20],
Klein et al. introduce a computational model for habit
contagion and change in a social network, in which cog-
nitive processes are combined with interaction mecha-
nisms. In this paper, we adopt similar models to capture
imitation mechanisms between users.
3 The ABM Framework
We consider a two-stage interaction model.
In the first stage, which happens daily, user pub-
lish information about their current energy consump-
tion behaviour. The parameters that we consider in this
paper are the users’ tolerance to delaying the starting
time of their appliances and the daily bill. This stage
may leverage a gamification platform such as the one
described in [15], which could connect either real-life
friends or simply people having similar habits. Users
observe the information published by their social con-
nections and modify their own tolerance. The platform
may influence users behavior by filtering information,
for example by advertising information about users that
are saving on their bill. The output of this stage is a
numerical parameter representing the delay tolerance
Table 1: Table of Symbols
Notation Description
U , T set of users and set of time slots within
the optimisation horizon
Au = AFu ∪ ASu set of appliances of user u ∈ U , includ-
ing non-shiftable (AFu ) and shiftable ap-
pliances (ASu)
I = {Iu}u∈U set of strategies profiles Iu of users u ∈ U
P = {Pu}u∈U set of utility functions Pu of users u ∈ U
JU set of iterations of the load scheduling
game played by the users in U
Nau, ctau load profile duration of appliance a ∈ Au
owned by user u ∈ U
ctau comfort profile of appliance a ∈ Au
owned by user u ∈ U during each time
slot t ∈ T
γau minimum delay tolerance level of user u ∈
U for appliance a ∈ ASu
luan power consumption of appliance a ∈ Au
owned by user u ∈ U during slot n ∈
Nau = {1, 2, . . . , Nau}
bt electricity price during time slot t ∈ T
s, cAnc slope of the energy cost function and cost
of ancillary services
T duration of a time slot
piu contractual limit of user u ∈ U on maxi-
mum energy consumption per slot
yjut energy consumption of user u ∈ U during
slot t ∈ T at game iteration j ∈ JU
pjut aggregated energy consumption of users
in U \ {u} during slot t ∈ T at game iter-
ation j ∈ JU
xjat binary variable set to 1 if the start time
of appliance a of user u is scheduled at
time t ∈ T at game iteration j ∈ JU , 0
otherwise
threshold of each user. This stage may either involve
the end-user or may be automated.
In the second stage, a EMS schedules the deferrable
appliances over the following day taking as input from
each user the desired starting time and the delay tol-
erance. This stage is fully automated and leverages an
EMS coordinator that circulates consumption informa-
tion among the EMS of the various users until a satis-
factory schedule is found.
In the rest of the Section, we first describe the auto-
mated load scheduling stage and then the social inter-
action stage. Table 1 lists all the symbols used in this
Section.
3.1 The Load Scheduling Algorithm
We consider a set of residential users, U , who allocate
their power demand over a 24-hour time period divided
into a set, T , of time slots of duration T . Each user
u ∈ U owns a set of non-interruptible electric appli-
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ances, Au, that must run once a day. The load pro-
file of each appliance a ∈ Au lasts Nau time slots and
its value in the nth time slot is given by luan (with
n ∈ Nau = {1, 2.., Nau}). For the sake of easiness, we
assume that luan is constant for the whole duration of
the nth time slot. Each appliance a ∈ Au is also associ-
ated to a set of parameters ctau ∈ [0, 1] which define the
comfort level perceived by user u in starting appliance
a at time slot t ∈ T . The rationale behind the definition
of such comfort level is the following: each user decides
a preferred time slot for the starting time of her ap-
pliances. However, in case of deferrable appliances, she
can tolerate to delay the starting time up to a certain
number of time slots. Intuitively, the higher the delay
is, the less comfortable such schedule is perceived by
the user. It follows that the less pronounced the pref-
erence of user u for starting appliance a at time slot t
is, the lower ctau is. In the extreme case of c
t
au = 0, user
u will never turn on appliance a at slot t. In addition,
user u specifies a threshold γau ∈ (0, 1] indicating the
minimum acceptable delay tolerance level for appliance
a, which defines the degree of flexibility of the user in
scheduling her appliances: the lower γau is, the more
tolerant to delaying their starting time the user will be.
Each user u ∈ U may own two different types of
appliances. Non-shiftable appliances (e.g., lights, TV),
represented by the subset AFu ⊆ Au, have a predefined
starting time that cannot be shifted. Such constraint is
imposed by assuming that there exists exactly one time
slot tau ∈ T such that the condition expressed by Eq.
(1) is satisfied
ctau =
{
1 if t = tau
0 else
(1)
which guarantees that non-shiftable devices have only
one allowed starting time and that the system is forced
to start them at time tau. Note that in this study we
consider interruptible appliances in the same class as
non-shiftable ones, since state-of-the-art algorithms for
the automatic control of such type of appliances are
typically designed to have no impact on the comfort
level perceived by the users. Conversely, shiftable appli-
ances (e.g., washing machine, dishwasher), represented
by the subset ASu ⊆ Au, are controllable devices and
their starting time is an output of a scheduling algo-
rithm. For these appliances, ctau may assume non-zero
values in multiple slots, providing that there exists at
least one time slot t such that ctau = 1 (i.e., t is u’s
preferred starting time for appliance a).
As depicted in Figure 1, the scheduling strategy iu of
player u is described by a set of binary decision variables
defined as per Eq. (2):
xtau =
{
1 if appliance a of user u is started at time t
0 otherwise
(2)
The set of all strategies of u is denoted by Iu.
We say that the strategy iu is feasible if it satisfies
the following constraints:∑
a∈AFu
ctaux
t
au ≥ |AFu | (3)∑
t∈T
ctaux
t
au ≥ γau ∀a ∈ ASu (4)∑
t∈T
xtau = 1 ∀a ∈ Au (5)
Constraints (3)-(4) ensure that the starting time of
every appliance a provides a comfort level higher than
the acceptability threshold γau. Constraints (5) impose
that each appliance is executed exactly once per day.1
The pair ({ctau | t ∈ T , a ∈ Au}, {γau | a ∈ Au})
is called the comfort characteristic of user u. More-
over, a comfort characteristic Cu := ({ctau | t ∈ T , a ∈
Au}, {γau | a ∈ Au}) of user u is said to be consistent
with the contractual limit2 piu on the amount of pur-
chasable energy per time slot if there exists a strategy
iu such that:
∑
a∈Au
∑
n∈Nau :
n≤t
luan · xt−n+1au ≤ piu ∀t ∈ T (6)
Constraints (6) determine the overall consumption
of the appliances in each time slot and bound the amount
of purchasable energy in order not to exceed the con-
tractual limit, piu. Such consumption depends on the
scheduling strategy: the energy required by each device
a in every time slot t is equal to the energy consump-
tion indicated by the nth sample (with n ∈ Nau =
{1, 2.., Nau}) of the load profile, luan, executed at time
t. Note that the energy amount indicated by the nth
sample of the appliance load profile is consumed dur-
ing slot t only in case the appliance is started at time
t− n+ 1, thus if xt−n+1au = 1.
The non empty set of feasible scheduling strategies
consistent with piu is denoted by ICu . We also say that
ICu is determined by (Cu, piu).
1 Such a condition can be easily generalised to include an
upper bound on the number of usages of an appliance.
2 Contracts typically impose a limit Π on the peak power
consumption, which can be straightforwardly converted in an
energy consumption limit per time slot piu = ΠT , where T is
the time slot duration.
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We model the price of electricity at time t ∈ T ,
bt(·) as an increasing function of the total energy de-
mand of the group of users U at time t [25]. Under this
assumption, prices will increase during peak consump-
tion periods. Therefore, an energy utility may impose
such a price function with the goal of inducing peak
shaving. For this reason, due to the conflicting goals
of the users, the load scheduling problem cannot be
solved with a centralised approach. Thus, we adopt the
distributed game-theoretic framework proposed in [re-
moved citation], which models the problem as a game
G = {U , I,P}, defined by: i) the players representing
the users in the set U , each one associated to a com-
fort characteristic Cu and a contractual limit piu on the
purchasable energy per time slot; ii) the strategy set
I , ∏u∈U ICuu , where ICuu indicates the strategy set
of player u corresponding to her feasible load schedules
determined by (Cu, piu) (we assume here that such set is
not empty); iii) the payoff function set P , {Pu}u∈U ,
where Pu is the payoff function of user u, which coin-
cides with her daily electricity bill.
The payoff function of each player, Pu, is defined as
a function of I as per Eq. (7):
Pu(I) =
∑
t∈T
yutbt(yt) (7)
where
yut =
∑
a∈Au
∑
n∈Nau :n≤t
luan · xt−n+1au (8)
is the energy demand of user u at time t and bt(yt)
is the price of electricity at time t defined as a lin-
ear function of yt =
∑
u∈U yut, which represents the
total electricity demand of the players at time t. In
[removed citation], it has been proved that such func-
tion is a regular pricing function. It thence follows that
G is a generalised ordinal potential game, with P (I)
being the potential function. Potential games admit at
least one pure Nash Equilibrium which can be obtained
by applying the Finite Improvement Property (FIP).
Such propriety guarantees that any sequence of asyn-
chronous improvement steps is finite and converges to
a pure Nash equilibrium. In particular, a succession of
best response updates converges to a pure equilibrium
[21]. As proposed in [removed citation], we assume that
the best response method is implemented in an itera-
tive way as follows. Users in U are listed in a predefined
order. The first user initiates the algorithm by choos-
ing his/her optimal load schedule assuming flat tariffs.
Then, as depicted in Figure 2, the user communicates
her scheduled energy profile to the next user in the
list, who executes the same operations but considering
the hourly energy prices calculated from the expected
Fig. 1: Inputs and outputs of the adopted load schedul-
ing algorithm
SCHEDULE 
UPDATE 
SCHEDULE 
UPDATE 
SCHEDULE 
UPDATE 
SCHEDULE 
UPDATE 
Fig. 2: Iterative implementation of the best-response
mechanism
hourly load obtained by summing the schedules of all
the users in the list. At every iteration energy prices are
updated and, as a consequence, other users can decide
to modify their schedules. The procedure stops when
none of the users alters her schedule in an iteration,
meaning that convergence is reached.
In order to find the optimal schedule, each user
solves the following Mixed Integer Non-linear Program-
ming Model that minimises the objective function ex-
pressed by Formula (9):
min
∑
t∈T
yut · bt (9)
subject to constraints (3)-(6), where bt = b
Anc+s(yut+
put), being put the total energy demand of the players
of the set U \ {u} received by user u at the current
game iteration, bAnc the cost of ancillary services (e.g.,
electricity transport, distribution and dispatching, fre-
quency regulation, power balance) and s the slope of
the cost function, respectively.
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3.2 The Agent-based Model
We consider a time span of L days. During each day,
users socially interact and influence one another’s delay
tolerance thresholds γau. The social interaction is medi-
ated by a platform that collects each user’s delay toler-
ance thresholds and the daily energy bill and distributes
that information to the user’s friends or to other similar
users according to some filtering rules. For example a
user might be willing to compare only to similar users
that pay a lower bill. As a consequence of the social in-
teraction, user u may modify his/her own values of γau
to be used in the next execution of the load scheduling
game (i.e., during the next optimisation time horizon).
This modification can be the outcome of a user’s ratio-
nal decision, or it can be fully automated.
Users may not interact with their friends on regular
daily basis (e.g. they may decide to communicate their
delay tolerance thresholds only occasionally). There-
fore, we characterised each user with a parameter p`u
which is set to 1 if user u is willing to compare (and
possibly revise) her delay tolerance thresholds on day
` ∈ L, to 0 otherwise.
Similarly to the approach proposed in [9], in order to
capture the users’ capability to make rational decisions
about whom to imitate (and up to which extent), for
each appliance a ∈ ASu we consider a two-dimensional
attitude space3 (see Figure 3) where each user locates
herself and her neighbours based on the delay tolerance
threshold γ`au of the current day ` and normalised daily
energy bill per appliance B`au defined by means of Eq.
(10):
B`au =
∑
t∈T
bt(yut)
∑
n∈Nau : n≤t
luan · xt−n+1au∑
t∈T
bt(yut) · yut
(10)
Based on her position, user u defines an area of in-
terest A`u (see shaded area in Figure 3) representing
acceptable bill-delay threshold pairs. The criteria for
the definition of such area depend on the personal at-
titude of the user (e.g., a user with a strong hedonistic
attitude would be willing to imitate users with a higher
delay tolerance threshold than hers, though their bill is
-even significantly- higher than hers, whereas she would
never imitate users with a lower delay tolerance thresh-
old, even if their daily expense is lower than hers) and
may be revised at each game execution.
3 This assumption also enables the users to redefine the
sets AFu ,ASu before each game execution, e.g. in case some
appliances are not regularly used on daily basis.
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Fig. 3: Users’ attitude space
The interaction protocol executed by user u at day
` ∈ L proceeds as follows. Let R[u] be the list of u’s
social neighbours. User u defines a boolean parameter
ηu′ computed as per Eq. (11):
ηu′ =
{
1 if (γ`au, B
`
au) ∈ A`u
0 otherwise
(11)
For each neighbour u′ ∈ R[u], user u updates the
delay tolerance threshold γ`au of each appliance a : a ∈
ASu ∧ a ∈ ASu′ by means of Eq. (12):
γ`+1au =
γ
`
au +
1
|R[u]|Γ (u) if (♣) holds
γ`au otherwise
(12)
where
Γ (u) =
∑
u′∈R[u] :
ηu′∧p`up`u′=1
ha(u, u
′)(γ`au′ − γ`au) (13)
and ha(u, u
′) is the similarity between the comfort pro-
files of users u and u′ with respect to appliance a. In
this paper we will define similarity as half the number
of time slots where ctau and c
t
au′ are both non-zero. The
condition (♣) is given by Eq. (14):
γ`au+
1
|R[u]|
∑
u′∈R[u] :
ηu′=1∧p`up`u′=1
ha(u, u
′)(γ`au′−γ`au) > 0 (14)
User u will then use the updated delay tolerance
thresholds γ`+1au in the next day for the execution of the
load scheduling game.
4 Modeling the System Evolution with Markov
Chains
The agent-based model described in Section 3.2 can be
analysed with the help of a discrete-time Markov Chain.
We make following assumptions:
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1. The user delay tolerance threshold can only take val-
ues that are integer multiples of a fixed step∆γ. The
total number of possible tolerance threshold levels
is 1/(∆γ) + 1.
2. The agent state is represented by its tolerance thresh-
olds at any given time for each appliance.
3. Each day is divided in iterations. At each iteration τ
a single agent interacts with another user and modi-
fies its delay tolerance threshold. This is slightly dif-
ferent than the model in Section 3.2, which considers
that the effects of multiple interactions are applied
at the same time. This assumption will make the
Markov matrix more sparse and, thus, more man-
ageable. On the other hand, the system will evolve
more slowly.
Without loss of generality we consider that each user
has a single appliance. Since the thresholds for the var-
ious appliances evolve independently, the full state of
each user can be described by a set of identical Markov
Chains evolving independently.
The full state at iteration τ for appliance a is thus
given by the tuple: (γτa1, γ
τ
a2, . . . , γ
τ
a|U|). Thus, the total
number of states is |U|1/∆γ+1, which grows exponen-
tially fast as ∆γ becomes small. Therefore the model
can be used only with a small number of levels.
At each time slot, an agent u uniformly at random
interacts with another user u′ uniformly at random and
changes its delay threshold as per Eq. (15):
γτ+1au = γ
τ
au+{⌊ δu,u′
∆γ
⌋
∆γ with probability
δu,u′
∆γ −
⌊
δ
∆γ
⌋⌈ δu,u′
∆γ
⌉
∆γ with probability
⌈ δu,u′
∆γ
⌉− δu,u′∆γ
(15)
with
δu,u′ = ha(u, u
′)(γτau′ − γτau) (16)
Thus, the transition probability is given by Formula
(17):
Pr
[
(. . . , γτau + k∆γ, . . . , γ
τ+1
au′ , . . . )|
(. . . , γτau, . . . , γ
τ
au′ , . . . )
]
=
1
|U|(|U| − 1)×[∥∥∥∥{u′ : k = δu,u′∆γ
}∥∥∥∥+ ∑
u′ : k=
⌊ δ
u,u′
∆γ
⌋ δu,u′∆γ − ⌊ δ∆γ ⌋+
∑
u′ : k=
⌈ δ
u,u′
∆γ
⌉ ⌈δu,u′∆γ ⌉− δu,u′∆γ
]
(17)
for all integer k such that 0 ≤ γτau + k∆γ ≤ 1, while it
is equal to zero in all other cases.
Fig. 4: Number of iterations to a steady state, depend-
ing on the number of users and states per users.
We used Equation (17) to model an homogeneous
system with ha(u, u
′) = 1/2 for all u, u′ and study the
number of time slots to reach steady state.
Figure 4 shows the average number of interactions
after which the state probabilities change over time by
less than 1%. The results are averaged over 100 Monte
Carlo simulations with random initial conditions. The
Figure shows that the number of discrete threshold
levels has a limited impact on the convergence time,
making it possible to study this important parame-
ter with large discretisation steps, resulting in smaller,
more manageable chains.
Additionally, we note that, for a very small number
of users, the interactions to reach steady state grow as
the number of users grows. Instead, for more than 5
users, the number of social interactions to reach equi-
librium does not depend on the size of the social com-
munity. Consequently, we can say that, for a large net-
work, the number of users has a limited impact on the
convergence time, whereas the important parameter is
the frequency at which users interact. Frequent inter-
actions, with a large set of neighbours results in faster
convergence.
5 Performance Assessment
5.1 Description of the Scenarios
In our tests, the 24-hour time horizon is represented by
a set T of 24 time slots of T = 1 hour each. We consider
|L| = 30 consecutive executions of the load schedul-
ing game presented in Section 3 and simulate social
interactions at the end of each execution. The parame-
ters of the electricity tariff, bt, are defined based on the
real-time pricing currently used in Italy. Specifically,
bAnc = 0.5e/MWh and s = 2.3× 10−2e/(MWh)2.
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We consider a scenario with U = 50 users. The set
R[u] of each user’s neighbours is computed based on the
topology of a random scale-free network graph gener-
ated according to the Barabasi-Albert model with mean
degree d, which is a popular generative model for based
social networks and online communities [5]. If not dif-
ferently stated, we assume d = 6.
Each user u has a contractual limit, piu, of 3 kWh
and owns 4 shiftable appliances (i.e.,ASu = { washing
machine, dishwasher, boiler, recharge of robotic vac-
uum cleaner}) and 7 non-shiftable ones (i.e.,AFu = {
refrigerator, purifier, lights, microwave oven, oven, TV,
iron}). The operation of shiftable appliances is assumed
to be controllable and fully automatised (i.e. by means
of a home energy management system such as the one
described in [17]). The energy consumption patterns of
each appliance have been extracted from a real dataset
[22]. On average, the energy consumption due to de-
ferrable appliances accounts for 55% of the total daily
consumption. For each appliance, the comfort curve ctau
assumes a right-angled triangular shape of 4 slots du-
ration randomly placed within the 24-hours scheduling
horizon, with values [1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25] (i.e., we assume
that the preferred starting time is the slot t such that
ctau = 1 and that users’ satisfaction decreases linearly
with delay). The initial values of the appliance delay
tolerance thresholds γ1au are randomly chosen with uni-
form distribution in the range [0, 0.75]. If not differently
stated, we assume that the probability of setting p`u = 1
is 85%.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed
interaction mechanism we consider four scenarios: the
first one assumes that the area of interest A`u of user u
is defined as:
A`u = {(γ`au′ , B`au′) : B`au′ < B`au}
(i.e., users imitate neighbours whose daily bill is lower
than theirs); in the second one we define A`u as:
A`u = {(γ`au′ , B`au′) : γ`au′ < γ`au}
(i.e., users imitate neighbours who impose lower delay
tolerance thresholds than theirs), whereas in the third
we set A`u as:
A`u = {(γ`au′ , B`au′) : γ`au′ < γ`au ∧B`au′ < B`au}
(i.e., users imitate neighbours who have both lower daily
bill and delay tolerance thresholds). Finally, in the fourth
one users imitate all their neighbours, regardless to
their bills and threshold values. The daily results ob-
tained in the four scenarios are compared to the ones
obtained during the first day (i.e. for ` = 1), when no
social interactions among the users have occurred. For
the assessment, the following metrics are measured: in-
dividual bill, i.e. the electricity bill of each user u ∈ U ,
and peak demand, i.e. the peak of the aggregated energy
demand of the group of users U defined as maxt yt.
5.2 Numerical Results
Average results obtained over 50 instances of each sce-
nario are reported in Figure 5, which shows that in
the first three scenarios the imitation of virtuous be-
haviours lead to non negligible decreases of the individ-
ual daily bills and of the aggregate peak energy con-
sumption. Bill reductions are more consistent in sce-
nario 2, i.e. when users imitate neighbours with lower
delay tolerance thresholds regardless to their bill (0.5%
reduction versus 0.3% in scenario 1 and 0.4% in scenario
3).
(a) Bill Reduction
(b) Peak Power Reduction
Fig. 5: Percentual reduction of daily bill and peak en-
ergy consumption depending on the definition of the
users’ area of interest A`u, with |U| = 50. 95% confi-
dence intervals are plotted.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
This is due to the fact that achieving a low bill does
not necessarily imply a low delay tolerance threshold:
users can indeed achieve low bills if their preferred ap-
pliance usage periods are very different from the ones
of the other users (e.g. they span night hours), which
would lead to lower values of the aggregate power con-
sumption and, consequently, to lower energy prices. It
follows that imitating users with low bills does not al-
ways lead to an increase of the flexibility of the in-
dividual schedules. Conversely, the results obtained in
the fourth scenario show that imitating all the neigh-
bours regardless to their experienced bills and tolerance
thresholds causes an opposite trend, i.e. an increase of
the average bill.
In terms of aggregate peak reduction, simulation
results make it possible to conclude that Scenario 1
leads to the least peak power reduction, which settles
at about 0.9% less than the peak power obtained with
no social interaction. Better performance is obtained in
second and third scenarios, which provide similar peak
power reductions, whereas the fourth scenario does not
lead to noticeable benefits.
It is worth noting that imitating the behaviour of
other users disregarding the delay tolerance threshold
and the bill does not lead to any advantages and could
also result in an increase of the bill and of the peak
power. This is shown by the lower lines in Figures 5 (a)
and (b). It is therefore necessary that any social inter-
action is mediated by some filtering mechanism which
could be implemented by the interaction platform.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the delay tolerance
threshold γ`au of the washing machine for the whole pop-
ulation of users in a representative instance of the two
scenarios. As depicted in Figure 6a, in the first scenario
the imitation of the neighbours with lower bills leads to
a homogenisation of the thresholds.
Moreover, the average value of γ`au tends to de-
crease, due to the fact that people experiencing lower
bills are more likely to have chosen low delay toler-
ance thresholds. It follows that imitating them leads
to more elasticity in the scheduling patterns. However,
some users never alter their delay tolerance threshold:
this happens when none of their neighbours ever expe-
riences lower bill than theirs. Conversely, in scenario 2
the benefit of imitating neighbours with lower delay tol-
erance threshold clearly emerges: in this case, γ`au never
increases with time w.r.t. its initial value and remains
constant only in case the delay tolerance threshold of a
given user is always lower than the one of all her neigh-
bours. Results obtained in scenario 3 (resp. 4) shows
trends analogous to Scenario 2 (resp. 1) and are thus
not reported for the sake of conciseness.
Table 2 shows the the aggregate peak power con-
sumption and total bill of the group of users under three
different assumptions: (1) the users do not tolerate any
delay in the starting time of their shiftable appliances,
which thus behave as non-shiftable ones; (2) the users
have variable tolerance thresholds but do not socially
interact with one another and therefore their thresholds
do not change over time; (3) users imitate neighbours
that experience a bill lower than their own (former Sce-
nario 1). The savings from (1) to (2) are in line with
previous literature on Demand Side Management (e.g.
[7]); the additional saving from (2) to (3) is due to the
social interaction, when only the users with a better bill
are imitated.
We now further refine our assessment focusing on
scenario 1 (i.e. the imitation of users experiencing lower
bills). Fig. 7 reports bill and peak power savings de-
pending on the level of participation of the users to the
social interactions. Intuitively, the more the users are
willing to interact and revise their strategies based on
the comparison of their bill to those of their neighbours,
the higher are the obtained savings. Fig. 7 shows that
increasing the level of user activity from 50% to 100%
(a) Scenario 1
(b) Scenario 2
Fig. 6: Trend of the whashing machine delay tolerance
threshold γ`au over time depending on the definition of
the users’ area of interest A`u.
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Table 2: Comparison of the aggregate peak power and
aggregate bill after 30 days.
Peak
Strategy Power (kW) Bill (e )
No delay tolerated 26.7 180
Random delay tolerance, no
social interaction
20.8 169
Social interaction with users
with lower bill
20.6 168
(a) Bill Reduction
(b) Peak Power Reduction
Fig. 7: Percentual reduction of daily bill and peak en-
ergy consumption for different values of the parameter
p`u. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
doubles both the bill reduction and the peak power re-
duction achievable in one month.
Moreover, we evaluate the impact of the mean de-
gree of connectivity d of the social network: Fig. 8 shows
that increasing d from 3 (which corresponds to an user
interacting with around 4% of the other users) to 6 (i.e.
each user interacts on average with 10% of the other
users) almost triplicates the bill reduction and doubles
the peak power reduction. Further increasing d did not
lead to noticeable additional savings.
(a) Bill Reduction
(b) Peak Power Reduction
Fig. 8: Percentual reduction of daily bill and peak en-
ergy consumption depending on the average connectiv-
ity degree of the social network. 95% confidence inter-
vals are plotted.
Finally, we investigate the impact of the total num-
ber of users participating to the DSM protocol. Inter-
estingly, as shown in Fig. 9 increasing the cardinality of
the set of users does not lead to significant variations in
the average bill reduction, whereas the peak power re-
duction is highest for very small groups (e.g. 25 users).
In fact, when there are fewer users the impact of each
user on the peak power is larger and it is sufficient that
a single user lowers his/her delay tolerance threshold
to have a beneficial effect on the peak power. As the
number of users grows, it is necessary that many users
improve their tolerance for having a significant effect.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact that social inter-
action has on the peak power demand of a group of
users who own shiftable domestic appliances. One of the
problems with demand side management is that user
flexibility varies over time, depending on observed sav-
ings and social pressure. In this study, we assume that
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 11
(a) Bill Reduction
(b) Peak Power Reduction
Fig. 9: Percentual reduction of daily bill and peak en-
ergy consumption depending on the total number of
users. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
users are willing to vary their delay tolerance thresholds
over time by matching the ones of the users of their so-
cial group. We show with simulations that social inter-
action cannot, by itself, drive the users to shave their
aggregate power consumption. Instead, if the users im-
itate other users with lower bill or with greater delay
tolerance, the overall peak demand lowers, with bene-
ficial results on the energy management costs.
The models and the findings of this paper can be
used by utilities to study how much user awareness of
other users’ behaviour can impact on the demand. We
also show that a limited number of interactions with a
relatively small set of neighbours is sufficient to achieve
a steady state condition.
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